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A RESPONSE TO JOHN HICK
George I. Mavrodes

Hick professes now to be a "poly-something" and a "mono-something."
Most of my response is directed to these claims. I suggest that (contrary to
my earlier assumption) Hick does not take any of the gods of the actual religions to be real. They are much more like fictional characters than like
Kantian phenomena. He is "poly" about these insubstantia.
I argue that Hick is not "mono" about anything at all of religious significance. In particular, he is not a mono-Realist.
I conclude by arguing that Hick has no satisfactory support for the sort
of ineffability which he attributes to the Real.

I suggested in my original paper that Professor John Hick may be the most
important Western philosophical defender of polytheism. Unfortunately,
Hick himself takes vigorous exception to this, initially construing it as
either an extravagant compliment or a splendid insult. Well, I certainly did
not intend it as an insult of any sort. To some extent, I meant it as a compliment (though it was not, in my opinion at least, extravagant). Primarily,
however, I intended it as a straightforward characterization of Hick's version of religious pluralism. In his paper here, Hick has in the end elected to
take my characterization as a jest. And that, no doubt, is better than an
insult.
Hick also returns the characterization, "polytheist," to me. I don't mind
taking it as a compliment, but I have no desire at all to construe it as either
an insult or a jest. For I do now think of myself as a descriptive (though not
a cultic) polytheist. My polytheism is somewhat different from that which I
attribute to Hick (but similar to that which I attribute to most Christian
thinkers), and I have (I think) different reasons for it. But I discussed those
points in the earlier paper, and I will not rehearse that discussion here.
But anyway, if Hick is not a polytheist then what is he? In his present
paper he gives a curious answer, describing himself as "at one level a polysomething, though not precisely a poly-theist, and at another level a monosomething, though not precisely a mono-theist."! So, a poly-something.
What is that?
In reading An Interpretation of Religion I got the impression that Hick
thought that Allah, the Holy Trinity, Shiva, etc., were the gods worshipped
in some various religions. And in some other religions the roughly correFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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sponding objects of adoration were "impersonal ultimates"-e.g., Brahman,
the Tao, etc. I also got the impression that all of these were distinct from
one another. And finally, I had the impression that (on Hick's view) all of
these were real beings. 2 That is what led me to the conclusion that Hick was
really a serious (descriptive) polytheist. 3
Of course, Hick also says that none of these gods is the really ultimate,
"the Real" as he calls it. In the book, as in his present paper, he repeatedly
appeals to Kantian metaphysics-Le., to the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal. Given this distinction, the various gods, etc.,
would be phenomenal entities, and the Real would be the noumenon which
lay behind them.
But in the Kantian scheme of things, as I understand it at least, a cantaloupe is a phenomenal entity. It is not a noumenon, it is not an ultimate
reality, it is not the Ding an sich. Nevertheless, I did not imagine that a
Kantian produce manager would feel insulted if he were described as
believing that there were exactly 39 cantaloupes in the super-market bin. 4 I
suppose he would think that cantaloupes were just the sort of things of
which it made sense to ask whether there were one or many or none at all,
and that it was proper-indeed, commonplace-to believe and profess
some answer to that question.
Hick, however, seems to be fierce in his repudiation of any analogous
suggestion about himself and the gods. Why is that? Well, now I am rather
more hesitant than before in professing to understand Hick's views. But my
present conjecture is that I may have gone wrong in the third of the "impressions" I noted above. I now suspect, that is, that Hick (despite what he
sometimes says) does not think that the gods, etc., of the actual religionsAllah, Shiva, Brahman, the Holy Trinity, and so on-are real at all. Or, to
put it more cautiously, they have at best a very tenuous and weak reality.
They are much less real than, say, cantaloupes. And so no serious philosopher could be happy with the ascription to himself of a belief that there really are such beings, that they might have an impact on affairs in the ordinary
world, and so on. It would be as though someone were to ascribe to him the
belief that Santa Claus came from the North Pole on Christmas Eve to deliver toys through the various chimneys of the world. Despite his professed
Kantianism, Hick may really think of the gods of all the religions as much
more like fictional characters, illusions, etc., than like Kantian phenomena.
And what he is poly about is this whole group of shadowy insubstantia. 5
Well, so much for poly-something (here, at least). Hick also professes to
be a mono-something. What is he mono about? Well, of course, it is the
Real. Or is it? And what is the Real, after all? These questions react on one
another, and the vagueness of the "something" contributes to doubts about
the "mono."
In this paper, as in the book, Hick is at least sometimes true to the
Kantian framework in which he wants to cast his views. On these occasions
he says that the Real is not an item in our experience, religious or otherwise.
Not even a mystic could have an experience of the Real. And so he writes
here, "But on the pluralistic hypothesis, as I have tried to formulate it, there
can be no direct experience of the Real all sich ...""
If the Real is not an item in our experience, then what is its epistemologi-
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cal status? How does it get into our discourse at all? Hick seems to give a
straightforward answer to this question. The Real is postulated.
Now, I suppose that one may postulate whatever he or she wishes. But
Hick pretty clearly wants to claim that the postulation of the Real is not
arbitrary. It is grounded in some way. "I want to say that the Real an sich is
postulated by us as a pre-supposition, not of the moral life, but of religious
experience and the religious life ... "7 And "if from a religious point of view
we are trying to think, not merely of what is logically possible (namely, anything that is conceivable), but of the simplest hypothesis to account for the
plurality of forms of religious experience and thought, we are, I believe, led
to postulate 'the Real' ."8 And again, "hence the postulation of the Real an
sich as the simplest way of accounting for the data."9
But just what is being postulated to account for the data of religious life,
diversity, etc.? What is referred to by the expression "the Real"? A person
who experienced a certain entity might conceivably just give it a name, and
later on use that name to refer to that entity again, perhaps in trying to
account for some further data. And maybe other people could pick up the
use of that name from him, and use it in the same way (roughly a la
Kripke). But for a purely postulated entity, one which is not experienced,
that procedure can hardly be supposed to work. It would seem that a purely postulated thing must be postulated via some description of the intended
referent. What description is supposed to enable us to get a grip on what
Hick is postulating to account for the facts of the religious world?
Maybe this question can also by formulated in this way. It does not take
much effort to imagine a Christian who reads Hick, and then says something like the following. "Why, I know just what Hick is talking about. It's
the Holy Trinity! That's the most real thing there is, the ground of all reality, the creator of all things visible and invisible. So the expression, "the
Real," must be just Hick's name for the Holy Trinity. And maybe Hick is
right in thinking that the Holy Trinity accounts for all the facts about the
religious life of the world, and so on. But surely Hick must be mistaken in
thinking that the Real has to be postulated. For the Holy Trinity has been
revealed throughout the history of the world, and pre-eminently in Jesus
Christ."l0 But Hick himself seems to be committed to rejecting the advances
of this apparent friend.
Why? Well, Hick apparently intends that the Real, as he postulates it, is
in some way incompatible with the Holy Trinity, and so cannot be identical
with it. In what way? In rejecting one of my "models" Hick says (in the
present paper), "Presumably that one god, like the prince in the story, has
his/her own definite, describable characteristics, including the intention to
appear in a variety of ways. But such a god is not analogous to the postulated ineffable Real. This has no humanly conceivable intrinsic characteristics
(other than purely formal, linguistically generated ones), and is accordingly
not a person carrying out a revelatory plan." So, the Holy Trinity presumably has some positive, describable, properties-being a trinity, e.g., and
carrying out a self-revelatory plan, etc.-but the Real is ineffable and has no
humanly conceivable, positive, properties at all.]] Hence the Real is not
identical with the Holy Trinity.
So here then we have a little stuffing to put into the expression, "the
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Real." Hick intends to postulate something which is characterized by the
negative property of ineffability. OK. It seems plausible to say that that
thing, whatever it is, is not identical with the Holy Trinity (and, I suppose,
not identical with Shiva, or with Allah, etc.). But this stuffing, while it may
secure the distinction of the Real from the gods of the actual religions, bristles with problems of its own.
Spelling out some of the consequences of the postulated ineffability, Hick
says "we cannot apply to the Real an sich the characteristics encountered in
its personae and impersonae. Thus it cannot be said to be one or many, person
or thing, substance or process, good or evil, purposive or non-purposive...
We cannot even speak of this as a thing or entity."12 And because Hick is so
insistent on being known as a mono-something we naturally notice especially his recognition that the Real "cannot be said to be one or many."
For better or worse, that seems like a Kantian theme alright. Number
belongs to the phenomenal world, and one is a number. The Ding an sich is
not to be numbered, one or two or many. And so it would seem that Hick, if
he is to be true to his professed convictions about ineffability, cannot consistently be mono about the Real. And of course he is not mono about the gods
of the actual religions. It seems that in the end there is nothing at all about
which Hick really is mono-nothing, that is, which is religiously relevant.
Now, Hick himself says a little about this problem. "We then find that if
we are going to speak of the Real at all, the exigencies of our language compel us to refer to it in either the singular or the plural. Since there cannot be
a plurality of ultimates, we affirm the true ultimacy of the Real by referring
to it in the singular."13 But this is a strangely weak argument, or so at least it
seems to me. A mono-somethingism which is generated by a superficial
exigency of English grammar hardly seems worth getting steamed up
about. And anyway, could we not just as easily argue in the following
way? "English requires us to refer to the Real either in the singular or the
plural. But since the ultimate cannot be one, we affirm the true ultimacy of
the Real by referring to it in the plural."
I said earlier that the ineffability of the postulated Real bristles with problems. Let me conclude this essay by mentioning two others briefly. One
concerns Hick's attempt to ground this postulation by darning that it provides us with "the simplest way of accounting for the data." But isn't it
hard to see how something which is described only by the via negativa"not this, not that"--could provide any account at all, simple or otherwise,
for any positive data? The religious life of the world is amazingly resistant
and resilient. The religions of the world are surprisingly diverse. They are
culturally fecund. They produce actual human characters of profound
beauty and goodness. These are facts (or so, at least, it seems to me). What
could account for such facts?
We might imagine people-or maybe we need not merely imagine
them-who suggest that these facts may be accounted for by postulating
the existence of a god with a beauty beyond that of the earth, with a goodness fiercer than that of the greatest saint and gentler than the humblest
maidservant, and so on. That postulation might have a chance of accounting for some religious facts. But it is not Hick's way. He postulates something which is neither good nor evil, neither purposive nor non-purposive.
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And of course Hick's Real is not loving, not powerful, not wise, not compassionate, not gentle, not forgiving. The Real does not know me (or anyone
else), does not care about me (or anything else), and so on. The Real did not
create the world, did not design the world, does not sustain the world, and
will not bring the world to an end. What in the world does that Real have
to do with anything which happens in the world? Why would anyone suppose that it "accounts" for any fact at all, religious or otherwise?
Hick, I think, is himself unsatisfied with the ineffability which he professes. So he is continually drifting into causal, or quasi-causal, talk about the
Real-that it is the "noumenal ground" of certain experiences, that there is a
"transmission of information from a transcendent source to the human
mind/brain," the Real has an "impact upon us," and so on. But this talk is
either empty (though with the appearance of content) or else it violates the
prohibition of applying to the Real any humanly conceivable, positive, substantial characteristics.
The other problem concerns the claim of ineffability itself. Hick says that
"none of the concrete descriptions that apply within the realm of human
experience can apply literally to the unexperiencable ground of that
realm." 14 Why not? How in the world could Hick discover a fact like that
about the Real?
The line of reasoning to which Hick himself appeals is given in the succeeding sentence. "For whereas the phenomenal world is structured by our
own conceptual frameworks, its noumenal ground is not." This does seem
to be an authentically Kantian line of argument. But it does not, it seems to
me, support the desired conclusion. Suppose that we are puzzled by the
question of how there can be a genuine synthetic II priori knowledge of the
world. And then we find ourselves attracted by the suggestion that the
world is a phenomenal object-that is, it is somehow a human construct,
"structured by our own conceptual frameworks," built by us to match our
own human categories of understanding, our forms of sensibility, and so
on. And so now the problem of a synthetic II priori knowledge of the world
seems manageable.
But, of course, the difference between the noumenal world and the phenomenal is supposed to be that the former, unlike the latter, is not a human
construct. The noumenal is what is independent, prior, the ground, etc.
And so it would be wrong to say that the categories of human understanding, humanly conceivable properties, etc., apply to the noumenal world
because we constructed that world to order. For, on this Kantian-Hickian
view, we did not construct the noumenal world at all.
Nevertheless, it does not follow that the humanly conceivable categories
do not apply there. What does follow is that their application to the noumenal world is to be accounted for (if at all) in a way different from that which
accounts for their fit with the phenomenal world. And indeed some religions, at least, have at hand a ready explanation. For in those religions it is
held that human beings are themselves created by something (or better,
Someone) noumenal. And so the categories of the human understanding,
which structure the phenomenal, are themselves structured by the noumenal. And they are structured so as to provide for a genuine, though perhaps
finite, knowledge of the noumenal. According to this suggestion, the
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human conceptual and cognitive apparatus, as a whole, is adapted to an
understanding of both the phenomenal world and the noumenal world,
although the "direction of fit" is different in the two cases.

University of Michigan
NOTES
1. This reply usefully calls attention to the fact that the big three theological
"isms" -polytheism, monotheism, and atheism-are all quantifications on the
concept of god, and so they require a concept of god. They all need to have an
answer to the question, ''What sort of thing is it of which you say that there are
many, or just one, or none at all?"
2. E.g., "Within each tradition we regard as real the object of our worship
or contemplation. . .. It is also proper to regard as real the objects of worship or
contemplation within the other traditions ..." John Hick, An Interpretation of
Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p.249.
3. That, in fact, is the aspect of his work which stimulated my own philosophical interest in the topic of polytheism.
4. Maybe, though, he would laugh a little if he were described as a polycantaloupian? Surely he is a poly-something.
5. Many religious people think of the gods of other religions in this way.
But hardly any such people think that way about the gods of their own religion.
Hick's view suggests that almost all of the world's religious believers are wildly
mistaken about the objects of their worship and adoration.
6. But sometimes he talks in a substantially different way. E. g .. , "one can
say that the Real is experienced by human beings, but experienced in a manner
analogous to that in which, according to Kant we experience the world ..
."(ibid., p. 243). This is related to the "deep ambiguity" which I discussed in my
original paper.
7. Lac. cit.
8. Ibid., p. 248.
9. Ibid., p. 249. Perhaps in these latter two passages Hick means to shave
the ineffable divine reality with Ockham's medieval razor?
10. I have discussed responses of this sort at greater length in "The Gods
above the Gods: Can the High Gods Survive?", in Eleonore Stump (ed.)
Reasoned Faith (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
11. Unlike some aficionados of ineffability, Hick ascribes only a limited ineffability to the Real, and thus he avoids (initially, at least) the charge of self-referential incoherence. He allows that the Real may have some "purely formal"
properties, and that it may be properly characterized by negative properties,
such as ineffability itself. So he accepts the via negativa. He also apparently
accepts that the Real may have substantial positive properties, just so long as
they are not humanly conceivable. Cf. ibid., pp. 236-249.
12. Ibid., p. 246.
13. Ibid., p. 249.
14. Ibid., p. 246.

